Abstract. In 1994, Josh Benaloh proposed a probabilistic homomorphic encryption scheme, enhancing the poor expansion factor provided by Goldwasser and Micali's scheme. Since then, numerous papers have taken advantage of Benaloh's homomorphic encryption function, including voting schemes, computing multi-party trust privately, non-interactive verifiable secret sharing, online poker... In this paper we show that the original description of the scheme is incorrect, possibly resulting in ambiguous decryption of ciphertexts. We give a corrected description of the scheme and provide a complete proof of correctness. We also compute the probability of failure of the original scheme. Finally we analyze several applications using Benaloh's encryption scheme. We show in each case the impact of a bad choice in the key generation phase of Benaloh's scheme. For instance in the application of e-voting protocol, it can inverse the result of an election, which is a non negligible consequence.
Introduction
In the literature there are several homomorphic encryption schemes as for instance schemes proposed by Goldwasser-Micali [GM82] , ElGamal [Elg85], Benaloh [Ben94] , Naccache and Stern [NS98] , Okamoto and Uchiyama [OU98], Paillier [Pai99] and its generalization proposed by Damgård and Jurik [DJ01], Sander, Young and Yung [SYY99] , Gaborit and Aguillar [MGH10] . In this paper we focus our attention on Benaloh's encryption scheme. In [CF07] a survey of existing homomorphic encryption schemes is proposed for the non specialist. In [Aki09] the author also proposes a description and a complexity analysis of different existing homomorphic encryption schemes. In [Rap06] , the author considers homomorphic cryptosystems and their applications. In all these papers authors mention existing homomorphic encryption schemes and give descriptions of such schemes including Benaloh's scheme. Homomorphic encryption schemes have several applications. We only cite applications that are using Benaloh's scheme as for example voting schemes [BT94, RV05, CB87] , computing multiparty trust privately [CDN01, JKM05, DGK10] , non-interactive verifiable secret sharing [CB87] , online poker [Gol05] ...
Despite all these papers on applications and implementations realized by all these specialists, we were surprised to discover that the condition in the key generation of Benaloh's scheme can in some cases lead to an ambiguous encryption. How is it possible that after all these papers, results, protocols, even implementations and more than fifteen years nobody noticed it? In order to answer this question we will explicitly express the failure probability of the original scheme in Section 5. How did we discover this problem? We wanted to perform a time comparison of the efficiency of some well-known homomorphic encryptions. We proposed a methodology for testing their performance on large randomly generated data. So we started to code some of the encryption and decryption functions of homomorphic primitives. Benaloh's was one of the first one that we have tried. We were surprised to see that on some randomly generated instances of Benaloh's parameters our decryption function was not able to recover the correct plaintext. After verifying our code several times according to the conditions given in the original paper we were not able to understand why our code did not give the right plaintext. So we investigated more and were able to generate several counter-examples (one example of problematic parameters is given in Section 3) and more interestingly we clearly understood why and where the scheme failed. Indeed the bug is due to a very small detail, hence we proposed a revisited version of Benaloh's dense probabilistic encryption.
Contributions:
The first contribution is that the original scheme proposed by Benaloh in [Ben94] does not give a unique decryption for all ciphertexts. We exhibit a simple example in the rest of the paper and characterize when this can happen and how to produce such counter-examples. Indeed the problem comes from the condition in the generation of the public key. The condition is not strong enough and allows to generate such keys that can for some plaintexts generate ambiguous ciphertexts.
Hence our second contribution is a new condition for the key generation which avoids such problem. We not only propose a new correct condition but also give an equivalent practical condition that can be used for implementations. We also compute the probability of failure of the original scheme, in order to justify why nobody discovered the problem before us.
Finally we describe some applications using explicitly Benaloh's scheme. In each case we briefly explain how the application works on a simple example. With these examples we clearly show that if our new condition is not used then the wrong key generation can have important consequences. In the case of the e-voting protocol it can change the result of an election; for private multi-party trust computation it can really impact the trust that somebody can have in someone.
Outline: In Section 2 we recall the original Benaloh scheme. In Section 3 we give a small example of parameters following the initial description and where we have ambiguous decryption. Then in Section 4 we give a corrected description of the scheme, with a proof of correctness. The probability of choosing incorrect parameters in the initial scheme is discussed in Section 5. In Section 6 we discuss some schemes related to Benaloh's scheme. Finally before concluding in the last section, we demonstrate using some applications that the problem we discover can have serious consequences.
Original Description of Benaloh's Scheme
Benaloh's "Dense Probabilistic Encryption" [Ben94] describes an homomorphic encryption scheme with a significant improvement in terms of expansion factor compared to Goldwasser-Micali [GM82] . For the same security parameter (the size of the RSA modulus n), the ciphertext is in both cases an integer mod n, but the cleartext in Benaloh's scheme is an integer mod r for some parameter r depending on the key, whereas the cleartext in Goldwasser-Micali is only a bit. When computing the expansion factor for random keys, we found that it is most of the times close to 1/2 while it is ⌈log 2 (n)⌉ for Goldwasser-Micali. We now recall the three steps of the original scheme given in Benaloh's paper [Ben94] .
Key Generation The public and private key are generated as follows:
-Choose a block size r and two large primes p and q such that :
• r divides (p − 1).
• r and (p − 1)/r are relatively prime.
• r and q − 1 are relatively prime.
• n = pq.
where ϕ denotes (p − 1)(q − 1).
The public key is (y, r, n), and the private key is the two primes p, q.
Encryption If m is an element in Z r and u a random number in (Z n ) * then we compute the randomized encryption of m using the following formula:
Decryption We first notice that for any m, u we have:
Since m < r and y (p−1)(q−1)/r ≡ 1 mod n, Benaloh concludes that m = 0 if and only if (y m u r ) (p−1)(q−1)/r ≡ 1 mod n. So if z = y m u r mod n is an encryption of m, given the secret key p, q we can determine whether m = 0. If r is small, we can decrypt z by doing an exhaustive search of the smallest non-negative integer m such that (y −m z mod n) ∈ E r (0). By precomputing values and using the baby-step giant-step algorithm it is possible to perform the decryption in time O( √ r). Finally if r is smooth we can use classical indexcalculus techniques. More details about these optimization of decryption are discussed in the original paper [Ben94] . We remark that there is a balance to find between three parameters in this cryptosystem:
-ease of decryption, which requires that r is a product of small prime powers, -a small expansion factor, defined as the ratio between the size of the ciphertexts and the size of the cleartexts. Because p and q have the same size and r | p − 1, this expansion factor is at least 2, -robustness of the private key, meaning that n should be hard to factor. In the context of the P-1 factorization method [Pol74] , a big smooth factor of p − 1 is a definite weakness.
We notice that the cryptosystem of Naccache-Stern [NS98] , similar to Benaloh's scheme, addresses this issue and by consequence do not produce ambiguous encryption.
A Small Counter-Example
We start by picking a secret key n = pq = 241 × 179 = 43139, for which we can pick r = 15. Algorithm 1 may be used to compute the maximal suitable value of the r parameter if you start by picking p and q at random, but a smaller and smoother value may be used instead for an easier decryption.
Algorithm 1 Compute r from p and q.
We verify that r = 15 divides p − 1 = 240 = 16 × 15, r and (p − 1)/r = 16 are relatively prime, r = 15 = 3 × 5 and q − 1 = 178 = 2 × 89 are coprime. Assume we pick y = 27, then gcd(y, n) = 1 and y (p−1)(q−1)/r = 40097 = 1 mod n so according to Benaloh's key generation procedure all the original conditions are satisfied. By definition, z 1 = y 1 12 r = 24187 is a valid encryption of m 1 = 1, while z 2 = y 6 4 r = 24187 = z 1 is also a valid encryption of m 2 = 6. In fact we can verify that with this choice of y, the true cleartext space is now Z 5 instead of Z 15 (hence the ambiguity in decryption): first notice that in Z p , y 5 = 8 = 41 15 . This means that a valid encryption of 5 is also a valid encryption of 0. For any message m, the set of encryptions of m is the same as the set of encryptions of m + 5, hence the collapse in message space size. The fact that the message space size does not collapse further can be checked by brute force with this small set of parameters.
For this specific choice of p and q, there are r−1 r ϕ(n) = 39872 possible values of y according to the original paper, but 17088 of them would lead to an ambiguity in decryption (that's a ratio of 3/7), sometimes decreasing the cleartext space to Z 3 or Z 5 . Details are provided in Section 5.
Corrected Version of Benaloh's Scheme
Let g be a generator of the group Z * p , and since y is coprime with n, write y = g α mod p. We will now state in Theorem 1 our main contribution: Proof. We start by showing (a) ⇒ (b). Assume two messages m 1 and m 2 are encrypted to the same element using nonce u 1 and u 2 :
Reducing mod p we get:
and using the fact that g is a generator of (Z/pZ) * , there exists some β such that g α(m1−m2) = g βr mod p which in turns implies
By construction of r, we can further reduce mod r and get α(m 1 − m 2 ) = 0 mod r and since r and α are coprime, we can deduce m 1 = m 2 mod r, which means that decryption works unambiguously since the cleartexts are defined mod r.
We now prove that (a) ⇒ (c). Assume that there exists some prime factor s of r such that y (ϕ/s) = 1 mod n.
As above, by reducing mod p and using the generator g of (Z/pZ) * we get
Let
and α and r are not coprime.
We now prove (c) ⇒ (a). Assume α and r are not coprime and denote by s some common prime factor. Then
And by construction of r, s ∤ q − 1 so y (ϕ/s) = 1 mod q.
We now prove (b) ⇒ (a). Assume two different cleartexts m 1 = m 2 mod r are encrypted to the same ciphertext using nonces u 1 and u 2 :
As before, we focus on operations mod p and we get
If α were invertible mod r, we would get an absurdity.
Notice than in the example of Section 3 we have y (p−1)(q−1)/3 = 1 mod n so condition (c) is not satisfied. We claimed that the real ciphertext space is now Z 5 , and we give a precise analysis of the cleartext space reduction at the end of Section 5.
Probability of Failure of Benaloh's Scheme
We now estimate the probability of failure in the scheme as originally described. For this we need to count the numbers y that satisfy condition (1) and not property (c) of Theorem 1. We call these values of y "faulty".
Lemma 1 Condition (1) is equivalent to the statement: r ∤ α.
Proof. Assume that r divides α: α = rα ′ . So
Conversely, if y ϕ/r = 1 mod n, then
Since r divides p − 1 and is coprime with ϕ r (by definition), we have r | α. Since picking y ∈ (Z p ) * at random is the same when seen mod p as picking α ∈ {0, . . . , p − 2} at random, we can therefore conclude that the proportion ρ of faulty y's is exactly the proportion of non-invertible numbers mod r among the non-zero mod r. So ρ = 1 − ϕ(r) r−1 . We notice that this proportion depends on r only, and it is non-zero when r is not a prime. Since decryption in Benaloh's scheme is essentially solving a discrete logarithm in a subgroup of Z p of order r, the original schemes recommends to use r as a product of small primes' powers, which tends to increase ρ. In fact, denoting by (p i ) the prime divisors of r we have:
which shows that the situation where decryption is easy also increases the proportion of invalid y when using the initial description of the encryption scheme. As a practical example, assume we pick two 512 bits primes p and q as
This example was constructed quite easily: first we take p ′ of suitable size, and increase its value until p is prime. Then we generate random primes q of suitable size until the condition gcd(p − 1, q − 1) = 2 is verified; it took less than a second on a current laptop using Sage [S + 10]. Putting it all together, we can also characterize the faulty values of y, together with the actual value r ′ of the cleartext space size (compared to the expected value r):
Moreover if r ′ = r, this faulty value of y goes undetected by the initial condition as long as u = r.
The proof of the first implication in Theorem 1 is easily extended to a proof of the first point of this lemma, while the second point is a mere rephrasing of the previous lemma.
This result can be used to craft counter-examples as we did in Section 3: for a valid value y of the parameter and u a proper divisor of r, the value y ′ = y u mod n is an undetected faulty value with actual cleartext space size r ′ = r/u. It can also be used to determine precisely, for every proper divisor r ′ of r the probability of picking an undetected faulty parameter y of actual cleartext space size r ′ . Such an extensive study was not deemed necessary in the examples to follow in Section 7.
Related Schemes
We briefly discuss in this section some schemes related to that of [Ben94] .
In [BT94], the authors describe a cryptosystem which closely resembles that of [Ben94] , but the conditions given on r are less strict. Let us recall briefly the parameters of the cryptosystem as described in [BT94]:
-y is coprime with n and y (p−1)(q−1)/r = 1 mod n.
It is clear that r 2 ∤ p − 1 is weaker than gcd((p − 1)/r, r) = 1, and that r ∤ q − 1 is weaker than gcd(q − 1, r) = 1. Therefore any set of parameters satisfying [Ben94] are also valid parameters as defined in [BT94] .
Unfortunately the condition imposed on y is the same and still insufficient, and finding counter-examples is again a matter of picking α not coprime with r. Our theorem still stands for this cryptosystem if you replace condition (c) by the following condition:
For all prime factors s of r, we have y (p−1)/s = 1 mod p.
Going back in time, the scheme of Goldwasser and Micali [GM82] can be seen as a precursor of [BT94] with a fixed choice of r = 2. The choice of y in [GM82] as a quadratic non-residue mod n is clearly an equivalent formulation of condition (3).
Before [Ben94] and [BT94], the scheme was defined by Benaloh in [Ben87] , with the parameter r being a prime. In this case our condition (c) is the same as the one proposed by Benaloh, and the scheme in this thesis is indeed correct. The main difference between the different versions proposed afterwards and this one is that it is not required for r to be prime, which leads in some cases to ambiguous ciphers. This remark clearly shows that all details are important in cryptography and that the problem we discover is subtle because even Benaloh himself did not notice it.
Finally the scheme proposed by Naccache and Stern [NS98] is quite close to the one proposed in [Ben87] but with a parameterization of p and q. It makes decryption correct, efficient, and leaves the expansion factor as an explicit function of the desired security level with respect to the P − 1 method of factoring [Pol74] (the expansion is essentially the added size of the big cofactors of p−1 and q −1). We note in passing that a modulus size of 768 bits was considered secure at the time, a fact disproved twelve years later [KAF + 10] only!
Applications
In this last section, we present some applications which explicitly use Benaloh's encryption scheme. We analyze in each situation what are the consequence on the application of using a bad parameter produced during the key generation.
Receipt-free Elections
In [BT94] the authors propose an application of homomorphic encryption for designing new receipt-free secret-ballot elections. They describe two protocols which use an homomorphic encryption verifying a list of properties. They also give in Appendix of the paper a precise description of a encryption scheme which satisfies their properties. Its relation with [Ben94] is given in section 6. The new voting protocol uses the fact that the encryption is homomorphic and probabilistic. If we have two candidates Nicolas and Ségolène then the system associates for instance the ballot 0 for Nicolas and the ballot 1 for Ségolène. The main idea is that the server collects the m authenticated encrypted ballots {v i } k corresponding to the choices v i of the m voters. Hence the server performs the multiplication of all these votes and decrypts the product once to obtain the result. The number obtained corresponds to the number of votes for Ségolène n S and the difference m − n S gives the number of votes for Nicolas.
We construct a basic application of the first protocol proposed in [BT94] and based on the example described in Section 3. In this example we consider only 20 voters. If the encryption is correctly done then the final result is {14} k . It means that after decryption Ségolène has 14 votes and Nicolas has 6 votes. But if as we explain in Section 3 instead of computing the result 14 mod 15 we are taking the result modulo 5, then we obtain a result of 14 mod 5 = 4. This time Nicolas obtains 16 votes and Ségolène only 4. This example clearly shows that this bug in the condition in the original paper can have important consequences.
Private Multi-Party Trust Computation
In [DGK10] the authors give a multiple private keys protocol for private multiparty computation of a trust value: an initiating user wants to know the (possibly weighted) average trust the network of nodes has in some user. In a first phase of the protocol, each of the n nodes splits its trust t in n − 1 shares (s i ) such that t = s 1 + s 2 + . . . + s n−1 mod r.
Here r is a common modulus chosen big enough with respect to the maximum possible global trust value, and in order to insure the privacy of its trust value the shares should be taken as random number mod r, except for the last one. The shares are then sent encrypted (using Benaloh's scheme) to each other user, to be later recombined. If we assume that one of the users has chosen a faulty value for his public parameter y, then his contribution to the recombined value will be computed mod r ′ instead of mod r for some divisor r ′ of r. As an extreme example, assume -that the queried user is a newcomer, untrusted by anyone (hence the private value of t for every node is 0), -that the true recombined value contributed by the faulty user should have been r − 1, -that r ′ = r/3.
Due to his miscalculation, the faulty node will contribute the value r ′ − 1 instead of −1, causing the apparent calculated trust value to be quite high (about 1/3 of the maximum possible trust value, instead of 0). This can have dramatic consequences if the trust value is used later on to grant access to some resource. These assumptions are not entirely unlikely: remember that r = 3 k is an explicitly suggested choice of parameter of the cryptosystem (chosen for instance in [JKM05] ) in which case ρ is close to 1/3 and faulty nodes occur with high probability even with moderate-sized networks. We note also that the description from [Ben94] is given in extenso, with its incorrect condition. One reason for choosing Benaloh's cryptosystem in this application is because the cleartext space can be common among several private keys, a feature unfortunately not achieved e.g. by Paillier's cryptosystem [Pai99] but also possible with Naccache-Stern's [NS98] .
Secure Cards Dealing
Another application of this encryption scheme is given in [Gol05]: securely dealing cards in poker (or similar games). Here again the author gives the complete description of the original scheme, with a choice of parameter r = 53 (which is prime). Because r is prime, this application does not suffer from the flaw explained here, but this choice of a prime number is done for reasons purely internal to the cards dealing protocol, namely testing the equality of dealt cards.
Given two ciphertext E(m 1 ) and E(m 2 ), the players need to test if m 1 = m 2 without revealing anything more about the cards m 1 and m 2 . The protocol is as follows:
1. Let m = m 1 − m 2 , each player can compute E(m) = E(m 1 )/E(m 2 ) because of the homomorphic property of the encryption. 2. Each player P i secretly picks a value 0 < α i < 53, computes E(m) αi and discloses it to everyone. 3. Each player can compute i E(m) αi = E(m) α with α = i α i . The players jointly decrypt E(m) α to get the value mα mod r.
Now because for each player the value of α is unknown and random, if mα = 0 mod r then the players learn nothing about m. Otherwise they conclude that the cards are equal. We claim that this protocol fails to account for two problems:
-there is no guarantee that α = 0 mod r. When this happens, two distinct cards will be incorrectly considered equal. -knowing the value of E(m) and E(m) αi , it is easy to recover α i because of the small search space for α i . This means the protocol leaks information when m 1 = m 2 . The fix here is to multiply by some random encryption of 0.
